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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ida Perez Vasquez appeals from her judgment of conviction for intimidating a
witness. Because the district court conducted a court trial without obtaining an express,
personal waiver of her right to a jury trial, Ms. Vasquez asserts that her conviction must
be vacated.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Vasquez’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Was Ms. Vasquez deprived of her constitutional right to a jury trial, under both the Idaho
and United States Constitutions, when the district court held a court trial in the absence
of a personal, express waiver of that right by Ms. Vasquez?
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ARGUMENT
Ms. Vasquez Was Deprived Of Her Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Under Both The
Idaho And United States Constitutions, When The District Court Held A Court Trial In
The Absence Of A Personal, Express Waiver Of That Right By Ms. Vasquez
A.

Introduction
Without first obtaining an express, personal waiver of Ms. Vasquez’s

constitutional right to a jury trial, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions,
the district court found her guilty following a court trial. The district court never inquired
of Ms. Vasquez whether she wished to waive her right to a jury trial.
Ms. Vasquez asserts that her constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when
her guilt was found by the district court, rather than a jury, in the absence of a personal
waiver. While Ms. Vasquez did not object to the lack of a jury trial below, she asserts
that the deprivation represents fundamental, structural error, and therefore, can be
considered for the first time on appeal.

The State has asserted that Ms. Vasquez

cannot satisfy the first or second prong of the State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010)
fundamental error test.1 The State is incorrect on both counts.

B.

Ms. Vasquez Was Deprived Of Her Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial, Under
Both The Idaho And United States Constitutions, When The District Court Held A
Court Trial In The Absence Of A Personal, Express Waiver Of That Right By
Ms. Vasquez
The State asserts that, while both the federal and Idaho Constitution provide for

the right to a jury trial, they do not require a procedure for waiving that right. The State
cites to Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008) for this proposition. Gonzalez

1

The State does not contest Ms. Vasquez’s assertion that if there is error in this case,
that error is structural and therefore not subject to a prejudice analysis.
3

is not particularly helpful to the State in the instant case. The issue in Gonzalez was
whether “it suffices for counsel alone to consent to the magistrate judge’s role in
presiding over voir dire and jury selection or whether the defendant must give his or her
own consent.” Id. at 243. The Court concluded that it was sufficient that counsel
consent in such a situation because,
acceptance of a magistrate judge at the jury selection phase is a tactical
decision that is well suited for the attorney's own decision. Under Rule 24
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the presiding judge has
significant discretion over the structure of voir dire. The judge may ask
questions of the jury pool or, as in this case, allow the attorneys for the
parties to do so. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 24(a); App. 20. A magistrate
judge’s or a district judge’s particular approach to voir dire both in
substance—the questions asked—and in tone—formal or informal—may
be relevant in light of the attorney's own approach. The attorney may
decide whether to accept the magistrate judge based in part on these
factors. As with other tactical decisions, requiring personal, on-the-record
approval from the client could necessitate a lengthy explanation the client
might not understand at the moment and that might distract from more
pressing matters as the attorney seeks to prepare the best defense. For
these reasons we conclude that express consent by counsel suffices to
permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial,
pursuant to the authorization in § 636(b)(3).
Id. at 250. Thus, the Court held that the attorney could stipulate to the procedure
because the manner in which voir dire was conducted was a tactical decision. The
Gonzalez Court noted that, “[o]ur holding is not inconsistent with reading other
precedents to hold that some basic trial choices are so important that an attorney must
seek the client's consent in order to waive the right.” Id. The Court then cited to
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004), which identified the choices “to plead guilty,
waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal” as among the basic trial
choices that are so important that an attorney must seek the client’s consent. Id. Ms.
Vasquez submits that, if the decision to waive a jury is a basic trial choice that only the
client can make, it is insufficient for counsel to waive such a right without his or her
4

client’s express consent on the record. Ms. Vasquez submits that in invalid waiver of a
jury trial is a constitutional violation, not a procedural, tactical issue like the issue in
Gonzalez.
The State also takes issue with Justice Burdick’s analysis of the Idaho
Constitution in his dissent in State v. Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503 (2016).

In

Umphenour, Justice Burdick stated,
Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution [. . . ] directs how that right to a jury
trial may be waived. It states:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.... A trial by jury may be
waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in
open court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in
such manner as may be prescribed by law.
Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the Idaho
Constitution that requires a defendant to personally waive his right to a
jury. However, a few years after the Idaho Constitution was amended to
allow a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial in all criminal cases, the
Idaho Supreme Court adopted a criminal rule that sets the standard for
waiver of a jury trial in felony cases. Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) states:
In felony cases issues of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a trial by jury
is waived by a written waiver executed by the defendant in open court with
the consent of the prosecutor expressed in open court and entered in the
minutes.
(emphasis added). Thus, although the Idaho Constitution does not
explicitly require a defendant to personally waive the right to a jury trial,
this Court has promulgated a Rule requiring such a personal waiver in
felony cases. The Constitution contemplates that the manner in which the
right to a jury trial is waived may be prescribed by law, which is precisely
what Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) does. Thus, in felony cases, I would hold
that a defendant must personally waive the right to a jury trial for that
waiver to be constitutionally valid.
Id. Justice Burdick concluded, “[b]ecause the record does not show that Umphenour
personally waived his right to a jury trial, there was a clear violation of his constitutional
right to a trial by jury. Consequently, the first two prongs of the fundamental error
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analysis have been met.” Id. at 510, 714. The State faults this analysis for several
reasons: 1) that it relies on a Court Rule; and 2) that the phrase “signified in such
manner as may be prescribed by law” applies only to civil cases. With regard to the first
issue, Justice Burdick determined that it was the Idaho Constitution itself that
contemplated that the manner in which the right to a jury trial would be waived, which is
what Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) did. Thus, Justice Burdick properly concluded that Rule
23(a) simply elaborated on Article I, Section 7, and thus whether a personal waiver was
obtained was a constitutional issue.
With regard to the claim that “signified in such manner as may be prescribed by
law” applies only to civil cases, Ms. Vasquez again submits that Justice Burdick was
correct. As pointed out by Justice Burdick, Article I, Section 7 provides, “The right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate.... A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases,
by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court, and in civil actions by the consent
of the parties, signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Ms. Vasquez
submits that the phrase “signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law” applies
to both criminal and civil cases; a jury trial in a criminal case may be waived by the
consent of all of the parties, in open court, and in a manner that may be prescribed by
law. A jury trial in a civil case may be waived by the consent of the parties and signified
in such manner as may be prescribed by law. Thus, there is no reason for Justice
Burdick to reconsider his opinion.
Finally, the State asserts that Ms. Vasquez cannot show that any error was plain
from the record because the law does not unequivocally require a personal waiver in the
record. (Respondent’s Brief, p.8.) Citing to two Court of Appeals cases, the State
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asserts that the second element of the Perry test requires a showing by the appellant
that the existing authorities have “unequivocally” resolved the issue in the appellant’s
favor. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.8-9 (citing State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 372 (Ct. App.
2011) and State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993, 998 (Ct. App. 2013). However, the Idaho
Supreme Court has rejected this requirement.
In State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214 (2014) the Idaho Supreme Court noted several
decisions by the Court of Appeals that had announced this standard, and then stated,
This Court has not held that for fundamental error to exist, it is necessary
for existing authorities to have unequivocally resolved the issue in
appellant's favor. This Court has examined whether additional evidence is
required from the record. See, e.g., State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313
P.3d 1 (2013) (examining the defendant's fundamental error claims on
issues that have not clearly been decided in Idaho); State v. Gomez, 153
Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012) (examining whether the evidence
sufficiently demonstrated that restitution was a part of the plea
agreement).
Id. at 221.

Thus, Ms. Vasquez need not show that existing authorities had

unequivocally resolved the issue in her favor.

She only needs to show that no

additional evidence is required. In this case, the district court did not get Ms. Vasquez’s
personal waiver on the record. Ms. Vasquez submits that this is all she is required to
show because she submits that the error is the failure of the district court to obtain the
personal waiver.
In sum, Ms. Vasquez has met the first two prongs of the Perry test and has
shown a constitutional violation that is plain from the record.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Vasquez requests that her conviction be vacated and her case remanded for
further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of March, 2017.

___________/s/______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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